Interpretation of Restriction of Risk Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies by Rendall, James A.
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 36 
2-1-1975 
Interpretation of Restriction of Risk Clauses in Automobile 
Insurance Policies 
James A. Rendall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James A. Rendall, “Interpretation of Restriction of Risk Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies” 
(1975-1976) 2:1 DLJ 158. 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Notes and Comments
James A. Rendall* Interpretation of Restriction of Risk
Clauses In Automobile
Insurance Policies
A recent British Columbia case, Sabell et al. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company has attempted a definition of the standard
automobile insurance policy restriction against "driving in
connection with the business of selling automobiles".' This
judgment by Ruttan, J. is mildly surprising for a number of reasons.
It places a generous interpretation on a clause used by an insurer to
restrict its risk and, in the result, recovery is denied to a third party
claimant. Thus, the judgment represents something of a departure
from the usual judicial treatment of exclusion clauses which are
most commonly construed rather strictly against the insurer; more
especially, having in mind the elaborate statutory scheme for the
protection of victims of automobile accidents, strict construction
may be expected in any case in which the insurer relies on its
exclusion clause as a defence to the victim's claim.
The plaintiffs recovered judgment against Ernest Agutter for
damages which resulted from Agutter's negligent operation of a
1961 M.G. automobile. Agutter was insured by defendant, Liberty
Mutual, under a Quebec automobile insurance policy, owner's
form. The "described automobile" in the policy was a 1957
Volkswagen registered in Agutter's name. Being in standard form,
the policy extended cover also to any other vehicle of the private
passenger type while personally driven by the insured or the
insured's spouse, subject to this critically important restriction:
"4(c) Provided that neither the Insured nor his or her spouse is driving
such automobile in connection with the business of selling, repairing,
servicing, storing or parking automobiles;"
The M.G. belonged to Montreal Auto Delivery Service which had
its own insurance on the automobile. In the ordinary course of
events this policy would have been a first loss insurance and Liberty
*James A. Rendall, Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. [197315 W.W.R. 248; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 113; [1973] I.L.R. 1-540 (B.C.).
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Mutual an excess insurer only. Unhappily for the plaintiffs, and for
Agutter, and for Liberty Mutual, Montreal Auto Delivery's insurer
had become insolvent. Accordingly, after obtaining judgment
against Agutter the plaintiffs turned to Liberty Mutual.
Liberty Mutual raised several arguments challenging the
jurisdiction of the British Columbia courts and the operation of the
provision of the B.C. Insurance Act conferring the third party direct
right of action. All of these issues having been resolved in favour of
the plaintiffs, the case was reduced to a question whether the
plaintiffs' loss was within the cover given by the Liberty Mutual
policy; more specifically, the issue was whether the M.G. was
being driven by Agutter "in connection with the business of selling
automobiles".
The arrangement pursuant to which Agutter was driving the M.G.
was stated by Ruttan, J., as follows:
.... he was engaged to drive from Montreal to Vancouver to deliver to
the purchasers, Hillcrest Auto Sales Ltd. He had been hired by Montreal
Auto Delivery Service to effect delivery of the car. He paid a deposit of
$107 to Montreal Auto Delivery and was to be refunded $87 at the other
end. He was to bear the operating expenses. It was not an uncommon
practice for vehicles to be transported to Vancouver from Montreal in
this manner.2
The act of transporting the car was not the normal occupation of the
insured who was a student returning to university, and using this means
of securing transportation across the country.3
Thus, despite Ruttan, J.'s reference to Agutter having been "hired"
by Montreal Auto Delivery, it is plain that he was not an employee
in any ordinary sense. This is important, for it is well understood in
the insurance industry that the exclusion in respect of "driving in
connection with the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing
or parking automobiles" is directed at employees of garages,
parking lots and other businesses whose employees will be driving
many vehicles. The risk that such an employee will inflict injury on
a third person, while driving a vehicle other than the one described
in his own insurance policy, is obviously much greater than
average. The theory in the industry is that the most satisfactory way
of dealing with this kind of risk is by way of a "garage policy"
written for the entrepreneur and covering the risk of liability to third
2. [197315 W.W.R. at 250; 38 D.L.R. (3d) at 115; [1973] I.L.R. at 1773.
3. Id., at 254-5, at 119, and at 1776 respectively.
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parties as a result of the driving of any employee. This focusses the
insurance cover, and the cost, on the business activity; the corollary
is an exclusion in the owner's policy which any employee may have
on his personal automobile.
Quite apart from its superiority from the point of view of the
business' customers whose cars may be involved, and from the
point of view of potential victims of negligent driving by the
employees of the business, this system is also preferred by the
insurance industry which feels that the risk should be underwritten
as a risk of the business activity rather than allowing the
entrepreneur to parasite on the individual policies of its changing
cast of employees. It is consistent with this position to insert in the
standard owner's form the exclusion which was contained in
Agutter's policy; thus, the higher than average risk of third party
liability is borne by the insurer of the business and is specifically
excluded from the risk assumed by the various insurers of the
employees in their individual capacities.
The competing arguments as to the application of this exclusion
in the circumstances of the arrangement between Agutter and
Montreal Auto Delivery are well stated in this passage from the trial
judgment:
The plaintiffs submitted that the exclusion .... was directed to the
individual, and not to the purpose for which the car was used. The
exclusion would apply only if the insured was in the course of his
normal employment in driving this car.
The defendant submits that it is the vehicle and not the driver that is
significant, and that the question is whether or not the vehicle is being
employed in connection with automobile business. 4
Ruttan, J. accepted the defendant's contention that the exclusion "is
directed solely to the use to which the particular non-owned vehicle
is being put" and that the "normal occupation or status of the driver
was not involved". 5 He concluded that the exclusion clause was
unambiguous and that quite clearly Agutter was driving the M.G.
"in connection with the business of selling automobiles". As a
literal interpretation of the exclusion clause this is undoubtedly
correct. The car was being driven to Vancouver for delivery to a
purchaser, and Agutter's driving was "in connection" with that
transaction.
4. Id., at 255, at 119 and at 1776 respectively.
5. Id., at 256, at 121, and at 1776-7 respectively.
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However, looking at Agutter, and at his conduct in driving the
M.G. from Montreal to Vancouver, and at what he and Liberty
Mutual may have had in mind when they contracted, the literal
interpretation operates very harshly. Can it possibly be said that by
driving the M.G. to Vancouver Agutter exposed himself and his
insurer to any higher risk of third party liability than he and it would
have faced had he driven his own Volkswagen? Would not the risk
have been the same if he had driven a friend's car, or had rented a
car from one of the car hire companies?
This case nicely illustrates the conflict which frequently arises
between two basic rules of insurance contract interpretation - the
rule that effect is to be given to the intentions of the parties, and the
"plain meaning" rule. In Pense v. Northern Life Assur. Co.
Meredith, J. A. essayed to combine these two rules into a single
guiding statement, ".... effect must be given to the intention of
the parties, to be gathered from the words they have used." 6 This
statement implies that, though the intention of the parties is the
object to be sought, it can be defeated by inaptly chosen language of
plain meaning. Heagle v. Great West Life Assur. Co.7 is a good
example of the harsh operation of plain language. In that case the
insurer refused to pay disability benefits for a seven month period.
Insured suffered such a severe heart attack in April that his
physicians ordered absolute rest and forbade any consideration of
business matters. In the result, the insured gave notice of his
disability in October. The insurer began payment of the disability
benefits in November. Although there was no evidence of any
prejudice to the insurer from the delay, and although he found that
the insured's condition was such that he should be excused for
having failed to give earlier notice, Stanbury, J. concluded that the
matter was foreclosed by a policy requirement for notification and
proof of disability as a prerequisite to the insured's claim.
There are two major objections to the "plain meaning" rule and
to Meredith, J. A.'s proposition that the parties' intention must be
extracted from the language they have used. The first is that the
language is not in fact chosen by the two parties; it is the language
of the insurer. Indeed, it has been said "policies are drawn by the
legal advisors of the Company who study with care the decisions of
the courts and, with those in mind, attempt to limit as narrowly as
6. (1907), 15 0.L.R. 131, at 137.
7. (1938), 5 I.L.R. 57 (Ont. Cty. Ct.).
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possible the scope of the insurance." 8 Judicial recognition of this
reality has prompted frequent resort to the maxim contra
proferentem in construction of policy language. Taft, J.'s
observation is particularly apt in its application to exclusion clauses,
as to which there are encouraging signs of a judicial concern to
prevent the insurer from appearing to give with one hand a very
large range of cover which it takes away with the other hand by
using numerous and broadly worded exclusions. 9
In Sabell Ruttan, J. found no necessity to consider the contra
proferentem maxim. He found no ambiguity in Liberty Mutual's
exclusion clause; indeed, he distinguished the only case cited to him
which was virtually identical on the facts, on the ground that the
policy language in that case had been found ambiguous. Nor did
Ruttan, J. make any reference to the special judicial treatment of
exclusion clauses.
The second major objection to the "plain meaning" rule was well
expressed by Rand, J. in the following passage from The Canadian
Indemnity Co. v. Andrews & George Co. Ltd.: .... .. 'meaning'
itself has rather shadowy boundaries, and even ordinary language
must, for a true understanding of what the parties meant by it, be
construed in the context and the circumstances out of which it has
arisen. '' 10
There may be an invariable "plain meaning" to the clause at
issue in the Heagle case,
If the company shall be furnished with proof that .... the insured
.... became totally and permanently disabled .... the company will
then grant the following disability benefit:
a sum equal to $10 for each $1,000 of the amount of this policy on the
first day of each calendar month following the approval of such proof
Harsh as it was in the circumstances of Heagle's case, the "plain
8. This observation was offered by Taft, J. in Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity
Co. v. Dorgan (1893), 58 F. 945, at 956, and has been quoted with approval by
several Canadian judges. For example, see:Lennox, J. in Graham v. London
Guarantee and Accident Co. (1925), 56 O.L.R. 494, at 506; Schroeder, J. (as he
then was) in Metal Stampings Ltd. and Lush v. The Standard Life Assur. Co.,
[1951] O.W.N. 625, at 628; [1951] I.L.R. 1-038, at 194; Tavender, J. in Tested
Truss Systems Inc. v. Canadian Indemnity Co., [1973] I.L.R. 1-552, at 1818.
9. For a recent case on this point, see: Tested Truss Systems Inc. v. Canadian
Indemnity Co., [1973] I.L.R. 1-552 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
10. [1953] I S.C.R. 19, at 24; [195214 D.L.R. 690, at 694; [1952]I.L.R. 1-089,
at 371.
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meaning" is that disability benefits begin with the month following
the giving and approval of proof of disability; the policy provided
for no relief against failure to give the notice, and there was no relief
in the Insurance Act.
No doubt it is tempting to say that "in connection with the
business of selling automobiles" similarly has a plain meaning even
though it operates harshly on Sabell and Agutter.
I submit, however, that the two provisions are dissimilar in the
extent to which their meaning is plain and that for this reason, as
well as for very important reasons of public policy, it is imperative,
when attempting a construction of the exclusion against "driving in
connection with the business of selling automobiles", to bear in
mind Rand, J.'s caution concerning the importance of the context in
which the parties adopted the language, and their purpose in
agreeing to the restriction.
First as to its "plain meaning", if Agutter offended the clause by
virtue of the fact that he was assisting in the delivery of the M.G. to
a Vancouver purchaser, would the clause apply equally plainly (and
with equal harshness) to the very common situation of "test
driving" by a prospective purchaser? It is virtually a universal
practice for an auto sales business to allow a potential customer to
take the car of his choice for a drive. Is the intending purchaser then
outside the cover in his insurance policy by reason of "driving in
connection with the business of selling automobiles"? There is
certainly a connection between his driving and the business of
selling automobiles, and if the connection is more remote than
Agutter's it is a matter of degree only, and a very slight degree at
that. Nor would the situation be saved by the "temporary substitute
automobile" or the "newly acquired automobile" language.
In the normal situation, of course, the auto sales business will
have an insurance policy to cover any third party liability which
results from an accident during the "test drive". The point of the
Sabell case is that abnormal situations arise: the auto dealer's policy
is invalid, or his insurer is insolvent, or the damages exceed the
policy limits.
I doubt that Ruttan, J., or another judge, would be prepared to
say that in this situation there is no recovery under the standard
owner's policy of the "test driver" now turned tortfeasor, and that
the insured (tortfeasor, "test driver" etc.) is deprived of his
indemnity and his victim is deprived of an insurance fund to answer
his claim. If I am wrong in this assessment of likely judicial
164 The Dalhousie Law Journal
attitude, I submit that we require action by the legislatures or by the
Superintendents, for in that event the situation is worse than I feared
and the standard owner's policy is truly a snare and a delusion.
Leaving aside the question of cases more extreme than Sabell and
the problems of logical consistency and line-drawing, let us return
briefly to the facts of Sabell and consider whether Agutter was
"driving in connection with the business of selling automobiles"
without reference now to whether that phrase has a "plain
meaning" in all circumstances, but considering only its application
to Agutter.
We have already noted the rationale for focussing on the high risk
business activity and underwriting the risk as a risk of that activity
rather than attempting to meet the problem by an underwriting
assessment of the extra risk faced by each employee of the business
so that the premium cost of each may be appropriately adjusted.
Thus, the standard exclusion against "driving in connection with"
the high risk business is really motivated by a desire to eliminate
from the standard owner's policy the extra risk which the insured
will face as an employee or in some other capacity related to the
business.
There is no fundamental necessity to construe the exclusion as
applying in every case in which the insured comes into contact with
the high risk business; it is really designed to guard against such
participation as increases the insured's risk. It seems quite plain that
Agutter's contact with the auto sales business in no way increased
his risk and that, according to basic theory, the exclusion clause
need not be applied to persons such as Agutter.
However, there may be a large number of people, not employees
or proprietors, whose contact with the high risk business does
increase their risk. I doubt that there really are many such, but let us
concede the possibility. No doubt insurers encounter difficulty in
drafting exclusion clauses which will eliminate all the extra risks
sought to be eliminated. An exclusion framed specifically for
employees or proprietors of "the business of selling, repairing,
maintaining, servicing, storing, or parking automobiles" might be
defeated by that hypothetical mass of shadowy personalities who are
not employees or proprietors but whose contact with the business
renders each of them a higher insurance risk.
People such as Agutter do not pose this threat. If they are subject
to the exclusion it is because the clause is worded so very broadly in
the hope of avoiding definitional difficulties concerning who is or is
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not an employee. The result in Sabell appears harsh precisely
because there is no fundamental reason to apply the exclusion to
someone such as Agutter, save for the problem of drawing a line
somewhere. I have already suggested that even the extremely broad
language adopted does not obviate the line-drawing problem - that
"in connection with" does not include every act of driving however
remotely connected to the high risk business.
The suggestion, then, is that Ruttan, J. has drawn the line in the
wrong place and has given the exclusion a broader effect than it
needs or was intended to have. It may be said that Sabell is a very
unusual case, that Sabell and Agutter are victims of the insolvency
of the auto delivery company's insurer, and that these harsh results
will occasionally occur despite the best and most careful of
insurance schemes.
There are really two objections to apologizing for the result by
pointing to the "garage policy" as the insurance which should have
covered and to its worthlessness as the cause of the hardship.
In the first place, there is no dominant principle dictating that the
'garage policy" and the standard owner's policy must be exactly
co-terminous. There are many situations in which different policies
overlap in their coverage and there is no reason in principle for
saying that Agutter's policy, which would clearly be an excess
insurance if Agutter were driving a friend's private passenger
vehicle, should not also overlap with a "garage policy" and provide
cover excess thereto. Indeed, as discussed above, we may all
suppose that our owner's policies overlap, to some extent at least,
with the standard "garage policy" and we may quite properly be
unsettled by any implication that the two are completely mutually
exclusive.
In any event, it is quite obvious that there should be no gap in
coverage between the two policies. At the very least, the standard
owner's policy should cover whatever the "garage policy" leaves
uncovered. And so it is that the second serious objection to fobbing
off Sabell as merely an unfortunate example of the hardship which
results when the policy which should provide the cover is worthless,
is the possibility that Agutter was never covered by the insurance
policy issued to Montreal Auto Delivery Service. This possibility
derives from the following exclusion in the standard "garage
policy":
EXCLUDED AUTOMOBILES
The insurer shall not be liable under this policy for loss, damage, injury
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or death arising from the ownership, use or operation of any automobile
furnished by the Insured to any person, except an active partner or
active executive officer or a full-time employee of the business ....
for his regular or frequent use ....
Clearly Agutter was not an active partner, an active executive
officer nor a full time employee of Montreal Auto Delivery Service.
Can it be said that the M.G. was furnished for his "regular or
frequent use"? Agutter's use of the car was not recurrent over a
long period of time. However, the drive-way arrangements
frequently allow as much as three weeks for delivery and the total
mileage may well approach one-third the annual mileage of the
average privately-owned automobile. Though perhaps not "regu-
lar" or "frequent" as one would normally construe those words,
Agutter's use of the M.G. could fit within the phrase if it were given
the kind of large interpretation which Ruttan, J. has given "driving
in connection with the business of selling automobiles".
In summary, Ruttan, 's interpretation of the exclusion clause
raises the possibility that Agutter had no insurance cover while he
was driving the M.G.1 1 ; at any rate, at best he had no cover under
his own policy and was completely dependent upon the auto
delivery company's policy. Neither of these positions is satisfactory
either to Agutter or to his victim. This case illustrates the difficulties
of literal interpretation and the dangers which beset such an
approach to construction even of the simplest language.
It is submitted that Ruttan, J. should have accepted the plaintiff's
proposition that the exclusion against "driving in connection with
the business of selling automobiles" is directed to the Insured and
not to the automobile. The exclusion appears in the individual's
policy and is required only to regulate the risk assumed under that
policy. If his driving does not involve any increase in the risk there
is no need for the exclusion clause to operate. If the individual
drives an automobile belonging to someone else his insurer
automatically has the benefit of the provision constituting the
driver's policy an excess insurance. So long as the driving is of the
same order and does not affect the risk, it should matter not whether
the borrowed vehicle belongs to a friend, to a car rental business or
to a business involved in the sale of automobiles. In the first two
11. That is, quite apart from the problem of insolvency of the auto delivery
company's insurer.
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situations, the driver does not lose the benefit of his own insurance;
his policy is constituted an excess insurance by statutory
prescription but does not purport to exclude him from cover by
reason of driving the borrowed or rented vehicle. The third situation
should not be treated differently so long as the insurance risk is
unaffected.
The decision in Sabell represents an unnecessary and disturbing
erosion of the insurance protection extended by the standard
owner's policy, and it shows the importance of construing policy
language in the context of the intentions and expectations of the
parties. There are very few phrases which have an obvious and
invariable meaning and which, therefore, lend themselves to a
purely literal interpretation. It is submitted that "driving in
connection with the business of selling automobiles" is not one of
those few.
